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1 Introduction
As detailed data sets about individuals’ transactions from discount and online brokers
became available in the late 1990’s, knowledge about the trading behavior of individual
investors has increased substantially. Most of the existing empirical studies analyze the
behavior of investors in the stock market. Fewer authors look at transactions in mutual
funds. Findings for investors trading derivatives are very rare.
Due to a unique transaction data set from a large German online broker, we are
able to extend the existing literature by analyzing the buying and selling behavior of
individual investors in a further kind of securities: bank-issued warrants. Bank-issued
warrants (warrants hereafter) securitize the right, but not the obligation, to buy (call) or
sell (put) a certain amount of the underlying security for a previously specified price up to
(American-style warrant) or on (European-style warrant) a previously specified maturity
date. The payoff structure of those warrants is the same as for plain-vanilla options, but
they differ from options in some institutional characteristics. First, the contract size is
much smaller. Typically, the owner of one warrant has the right to buy or sell one-tenth or
one-hundredth of the underlying with this contract. Secondly, these typical retail banking
products are issued by financial institutions only. That makes short-selling (i.e. writing)
warrants impossible for individual investors, so no margin accounts are required. Thirdly,
transaction fees for small trading volumes are lower for warrants than for options at all
German online brokers. Fourthly, warrants legally are obligations from the issuer directly
to the owner. There is no clearing institution as in the option market. Since all issuers in
the warrant market are financial institutions this default risk should be small and have
only minor price impacts.
Especially the first three points might explain why those products are much more
popular than options for individual investors with low money to invest. The market for
warrants grew rapidly since the first issuance of a stand-alone warrant1 in 1988. In Ger-
many, nearly 50.000 different warrants were listed in December of 2006 and the trading
volume was more than 1,4 Billion euros in that month.2
1Traditional warrants are usually issued in combination with a bond (so called warrant-linked bond). They give the
warrant holder the right, but not the obligation, to acquire shares of the issuing company and thus are always call warrants.
2See DDI (2007). For more details on the international markets for bank-issued warrants, see Glaser and Schmitz (2007).
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Despite the tremendous attention these securities have received in the last 10 to 15
years in Europe, Asia and Australia, little is known about what actually makes investors
trade these securities. We fill this gap by analyzing 89,958 transactions of 1,454 individual
investors in 6,724 warrants with 380 stocks and 17 stock market indexes as underlyings.
The structure of the warrant market, for example the existence of call and put warrants
as well as the possibility to invest in a whole index3, allows us to analyze the trading
behavior in several more dimensions than if one would look at stock market transactions.
For example, instead of comparing, in the absence of short selling possibilities, purchases
of stocks with sales of stocks to analyze the buying behavior4, we can compare purchases
of call warrants with purchases of put warrants. In addition, investors cannot only trade
warrants on single stocks, but also invest in whole indexes by purchasing warrants with
those indexes as underlyings. We relate our study to that of Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001b), but use transactions from a different type of security and extend the methodology
in several ways. Furthermore, we are able to link the transaction behavior in the warrant
market with the stock market transactions of these investors.
We report several facts about the trading behavior of individual investors in warrants
that are consistent with the literature on the behavior of individual investors in the stock
market. The warrant investors buy calls and sell puts if the price of the underlying has
decreased over the previous trading days and they sell calls and buy puts if the underlying
has increased. This means the investors follow negative feedback trading strategies in
all four of the observed trading categories. In addition, we find strong evidence for the
disposition effect for call as well as put warrants. The trading behavior is also influenced if
the underlying reaches some exceptional prices, e.g. highs, lows or the strike price. We also
show that hedging (as one natural candidate to buy puts) does not play an important role
in the market for bank-issued warrants. The probability to buy calls is positively related
to the holding of the underlying in the portfolio, meaning that investors tend to leverage
their stock positions, while the relation between put purchases and portfolio holdings of
the underlying is negative. Differences in the trading behavior in warrants with stock
market indexes or single stocks as underlyings are small.
We proceed as follows: In Section 2, we give a categorized overview over the related
3Exchange traded funds did not exist in Germany during our observation period.
4See Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b).
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literature concerning the trading behavior of individual investors. Our data is described
in detail in Section 3. Section 4 explains the methodology used and provides results for
the buying and selling behavior separately. A conclusion is provided in Section 5.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Individual Investors’ Behavior in the Stock Market
The examination of private investor data at the individual level already began in the
1970’s. In a whole series of papers based on brokerage account data and a large survey,
Cohn, Lease, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum5 were the first to describe several stylized facts
about the actual trading behavior of individual investors. Besides showing a wide variety
of demographic facts about individual investors, they are able to infer investors’ attitudes
towards risk by looking at the self-reported overall portfolio composition of the investors.
They also report the dependence of the investment style of the investors on age, income,
and gender; denying the influence of other demographics. They also find that individual
investors show some skill when it comes to security selection, but after correcting for
transaction costs, the net returns realized are indistinguishably different from passive
investment strategy returns. After those early studies, it took about 20 years until the
trading behavior of individual investors went back into the spotlight of financial research.
This attention is mainly due to the emergence of different data sets from discount and
online brokers, first from the US and then from around the world.
When it comes to analyzing determines transaction behavior, it is essential to dif-
ferentiate between buying and selling. This is because the motives for both groups of
transactions might be different. As Barber and Odean (2007) point out that a problem
in the decision process which stocks to buy and sell is the bounded rationality of decision
makers with cognitive and temporal limits. Individual investors have to choose from a
wide range of investment opportunities if they want to purchase a stock, but are limited
5They published several papers in mixed author combinations, i.e. Lease, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum (1974), Cohn,
Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1975), Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1977), Schlarbaum, Lewellen, and Lease (1978a),
and Schlarbaum, Lewellen, and Lease (1978b).
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to the stocks they hold in their portfolio if they consider to sell.6 The authors show that
individual investors’ buying decisions on the stock market are more attention-based than
their selling behavior. On the other hand, motives for a sale of stocks may possibly be
rebalancing or liquidity needs, but also a valuation of the asset in comparison to the pur-
chase price might influence the decision to sell a stock. Although most of the following
studies look at purchases as well as sales, we provide results for determinants of purchase
transactions first, and we look at sale transactions in the next section.
2.1.1 Buying Behavior
A large number of authors test whether past returns influence the trading decisions of
individual investors. Barber and Odean (2007) show that individual investors are net buy-
ers of stocks with high absolute returns. There are mixed results concerning the direction
of the influence of returns on the propensity of individual investors to buy stocks. Two
competing theories emerged: positive vs. negative feedback trading. While momentum
investors buy stocks after their value increased, contrarians tend to buy stocks that have
lost value prior to the purchase. For short horizons, most authors find a negative relation
between past days returns and net buying of individual investors. This short-term contrar-
ian buying behavior is reported for several markets, including the US (Griffin, Harris, and
Topaloglu (2003)), Finland (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001b)), Korea (Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999)), and Australia (Jackson (2003)). Only for
Germany, Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2007) find a positive relation for retail in-
vestor buying and returns the day before, while the return two days before is significantly
negatively related to net purchases. For longer horizons (4 month to 2 years), several
authors find positive feedback buying in different stock markets. A positive correlation
of purchases and past returns was found in the US by Odean (1999) and Barber, Odean,
and Zhu (2003), in China by Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, and Rui (2005), and in Japan by Kim
and Nofsinger (2002). Barber, Odean, and Strahilevitz (2004) show that stocks that were
sold for a gain or have decreased in value since they were previously sold are more likely
to be repurchased by an individual investor. Furthermore, in sequential round-trip trades,
investors tend to buy additional shares if the price of the stock is lower than the initial
price when they first bought the stock.
6Individual investors are reluctant to sell stocks short. Whether this is due to regulatory restrictions, higher transaction
costs or other reasons is not yet obvious.
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Besides past returns, additional determinants of the buying behavior are analyzed,
most elaborated by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b). They find influence of several demo-
graphics (e.g. age and gender) on the propensity to buy stocks. In addition, volatility and
monthly highs and lows of the stocks also influence the buying behavior. Kumar and Dhar
(2002) find that 3-month lows can influence the buying decision, especially for contrarian
investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001a) show that Finnish investors are most likely to
buy stocks from firms which have their headquarter nearby, also known as home bias.
2.1.2 Selling Behavior
Similar to the buying behavior, the selling behavior of individual investors is influenced
by demographics, volatility and prominent prices like highs and lows (see Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001b), Kumar and Dhar (2002), and Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, and Rui (2005)).
The strongest influence on the selling decision have past returns. In contrast to the positive
feedback buying (i.e. buying after high past returns over longer horizons) in the long-run,
the same studies find negative feedback trading when it comes to selling stocks (see Odean
(1999), Kim and Nofsinger (2002), and Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2003)). They report that
not only purchases but also sales are positively influenced by high past returns. This is
contrarian behavior. The same holds for short-term feedback trading. Investors tend to
sell stocks if the past days’ returns are positive (see Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003)
and Jackson (2003)).
This return pattern is consistent with the disposition effect. This effect was first
analyzed by Schlarbaum, Lewellen, and Lease (1978b) and Shefrin and Statman (1985).
The tendency to sell winners too early and hold on to losing stocks for an unusually
long period of time was documented for individual investors in several markets. The
disposition effect exists in the US (Odean (1998)), Finland (Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001b)), Israel (Shapira and Venezia (2001)), China (Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, and Rui
(2005)), and Germany (Weber and Welfens (2006)). As Odean (1998) points out, it is hard
to disentangle investors’ selling behavior based on beliefs of mean reversion in future stock
prices (no matter whether their beliefs are right or wrong) from the behavior according
to their reluctance to realize losses. Both hypotheses would predict that investors more
readily sell stocks that have risen in the past. In an experimental setting with and without
an automatic selling condition, Weber and Camerer (1998) show that the disposition effect
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is much weaker if stocks are sold automatically after every period, and that investors falsely
believe in mean reversion of stock prices although they should know about the trending
behavior of the stocks. Badrinath and Lewellen (1991), Odean (1998), and Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2004) show that the disposition effect is reversed in December, which is due
to tax-motivated selling, according to the authors.
2.2 Individual Investors’ Behavior in Derivative Markets
In comparison to the findings for the individuals investors’ trading behavior of in the stock
market, little is known about how those investors trade derivative products. Lakonishok,
Lee, Pearson, and Poteshmann (2007) show that non-market maker investors in the US
have more open interest in written option positions than in long positions for calls and
puts. If the investors buy options to open a new position, they purchase four times more
calls than puts. They also show that higher option market trading activity is positively
correlated with past returns and volatility, and negatively correlated with book-to-market
ratios. In addition they report that investors open and close long and short call positions
if past week’s return is positive and write puts as well as close bought and written put
positions if the past returns are negative. Different results are obtained by Schmitz, Glaser,
and Weber (2007). Looking at the difference in the holdings of call and put warrants, one
can infer that high (low) returns in the past two days change the aggregated holdings in
put (call) positions. This result is along the same lines as the short-term negative feedback
trading results from the stock market. Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz (2007) compare
the trading success of individual investors engaged in derivatives trading with the results
of non-derivative traders. Derivatives traders trade more and thereby underperform the
market by a substantial amount. Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) and Poteshman and
Serbin (2003) show that the (rational and irrational) exercise behavior in employee stock
options and plain-vanilla options, respectively, is related to past returns. While employees
typically exercise their options after the price of the underlying has risen in the past
month but fallen over longer horizons, option traders tend to utilize their right to exercise
these derivatives after high returns and if the underlying is near its highest price of the
past year.
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3 Description of the Data
Our analysis is based on the individual transactions in bank-issued warrants on single
stocks and indexes of individual investors, who trade with a large German online broker.
The data set contains detailed information on the transactions (investor ID, trading date,
warrant ID, type of warrant (call or put), type of transaction (purchase or sale), trans-
action price, number of warrants traded, transaction costs, and currency), the warrants
(warrant ID, name of the underlying, strike price, conversion ratio, and maturity date),
and self reported demographic information of the investors (investor ID, age, gender, in-
come, investment experience, and investment strategy). Transaction information starts at
the beginning of 1997 and ends in the middle of April 2001. Information on the prices of
the underlyings is obtained from Datastream.
1,454 investors trade 6,724 different warrants on 397 different underlyings account-
ing for 89,958 transactions. Table 1 shows that most of the transactions (55%) are from
warrants on indexes, despite the fact that there are only 17 different indexes as underly-
ings, when compared to 380 different stocks. This fact can be predominantly attributed
to the high number of transactions in warrants on the main German stock index DAX
(see Table 2). Another observation is that the investors make more purchases (55%) than
sales. The portion of transactions in call and put warrants is remarkable. Only 23% of all
transactions are in put warrants. If one looks at the portion of calls and puts in transac-
tions on single stocks, less than 6% of the transactions are in put warrants. In contrast,
transactions in call and put warrants on indexes are much more even distributed (45%
puts).
To describe the investors in the market, we use three sets of variables. First we
provide descriptive statistics for the trading in warrants itself (see Panel A of Table 3).
The average investor makes 55 warrant transactions. While half of the investors traded 18
times or less, some of the investors are involved in heavy trading. The individual with the
most transactions traded 1,461 times during the 1,080 trading days in our sample period.
This number does not include intraday trading since we netted all purchases and all sales
in one warrant during one trading day, from one investor separately.
To calculate the actual return and holding period per trade or per investor, we first
define round-trip trades as all trades in one specific warrant made by one specific investor
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from the opening of a new position, until it is completely closed again. Thus, a round-trip
trade always starts with a purchase and ends in a sale, while the number of the specific
warrant is zero at the beginning and end, but strictly positive in-between. Otherwise, a
round-trip trade could include several purchases and sales in a mixed order.7 We calculate
the net return of a round-trip trade as
return =
∑s
j=1 number of warrants soldj · sale pricej − tcj∑p
i=1 number of warrants boughti · purchase pricei − tci
− 1 (1)
where tc are the trade-specific transaction costs, and p and s are the total number
of purchases and sales involved in a round-trip trade. For example, a purchase of 1,000
warrants for a price of 0.90 e (tc = 10 e), a purchase of another 1,000 warrants for the
price of 1.12 e (tc = 10 e) 10 trading days later and the sale of 2,000 warrants for 1.06 e
(tc = 20 e) 20 trading days after the initial purchase would count for 1 round-trip trade
with a return of
2, 000 · 1.06− 20
1, 000 · 0.90− 10 + 1, 000 · 1.12− 10 − 1 = 0.05
For the return per investor p and s are the total number of round-trip purchases and sales
during the entire sample period. On average, a warrant investor receives 1.2% return on
the invested money over the sample period of over four years.
To put this number into perspective, one needs to know how long the investors hold
the warrants. To receive the average duration of a warrant position in the portfolio, we
simply calculate the average number of trading days the warrants within the position
remain in the portfolio. For the example mentioned above, the holding period would be
1, 000 · 20 + 1, 000 · 10
2, 000
= 15
trading days. An average investor holds his warrants for 69 days, while half of the investors
hold their warrants for 43 days or less.8 In addition we find that the median transaction
volume is 1,723 e and that investors typically trade warrants with a time to maturity of
108.35 trading days.
The second set of variable are from the stock portfolios of our warrant traders. In
Panel B of Table 3, we show that the median warrant investor trades stocks 74 times
7Similar procedures were used by Shapira and Venezia (2001) and Feng and Seasholes (2005).
8By only looking at round-trip trades, we exclude some warrants that were already in the portfolio at the beginning or
still in the portfolio at the end of our observation period. In contrast to stock investments, the sampling bias should be
small, because the holding period for warrants is much lower (the median holding period per warrant is 9 days) than for
stocks and thus only a few warrant transactions are neglected.
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during the sample period, holds five stocks in his portfolio that are worth 14,743 e. He
receives a monthly return of 0.4% bearing a monthly standard deviation of his portfolio
return of 12.4%, while the monthly return and standard deviation for the DAX index in
the same time was 1.7% and 2.1%, respectively.
The third set of information concerns self-reported demographic and investment
aim information of the investors. The age is measured as the actual years since birth at
the beginning of 1997, gender is a dummy variable indicating whether the investor is a
male (1) or female (0). For experience and income, investors were asked to state their
experience in trading securities and monetary income on different scales, respectively. The
experience categories were 0-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15 years, and greater than 15 years,
while for income the following categories could be chosen: 0-25,564 e, 25,565-51,129 e,
51,130-76,693 e, 76,694-102,258 e, and over 102,259 e.9 We used the midpoint of the
categories, and 17,5 years and 115,041 e for the last categories respectively. In another
question, the investors were asked to state their main goal of securizy investing, given
a choice of six different categories. If investors state that their strategy is to save for
retirement, the dummy retirement is 1; if not it is 0. If high risk speculating is the aim
of an investor, the dummy high risk is 1 and otherwise it is 0. The median investor is
38 years of age at the beginning of our sample period, has investment experience of 7.5
years and an income of little more than 38,000 e (see Panel C of Table 3). Only 4% of
all warrant investors are female and only 3% state that their main goal for opening the
online broker account is saving for retirement, while 19% say that they pursue a high
risk strategy. The remarkable portion of 72% held a mutual fund at least once during the
sample period.
4 Methodology and Results
The main focus of our paper is to show what the determinants of the buying and selling
behavior of individual investors in the market for warrants are. Is the trading behavior
similar to trading in other kind of securities? In addition, the structure of the market
for warrants gives us the opportunity to apply new methods to investigate the trading
behavior. We do this for purchases and sales of warrants separately, and further divide
9Originally the income categories were stated in Deutsche Mark (DEM). We converted the values with the official
DEM/EUR exchange rate of 1.95583 DEM = 1 EUR.
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the sample into calls and puts and warrants on stock market indexes and single stocks.
4.1 Determinants of the Buying Behavior
In the absence of short selling possibilities, the decision to sell a security differs from the
decision to buy, because the set of trading opportunities is restricted to those securities
one holds in his portfolio when it comes to selling. The set of alternatives is fairly small
in most cases. If someone decides to purchase a security, the set of opportunities is huge,
meaning every security traded on all markets, at least theoretically. To shrink the number
of alternatives, people may use heuristics. As pointed out by Barber and Odean (2007),
investors buy stocks that recently caught their attention.
To have a starting point to analyze what makes investors buy warrants, we assume
that the warrants an investor trades are the set of alternatives he can choose from. In
step one, we defined a dummy variable that is 1 if an investor purchases a specific warrant
on a trading day, and otherwise it is 0 for trading days on which this specific warrant is
tradeable (i.e. the time between the date of issue and the maturity date of the warrant).
This procedure is done for every warrant that a specific investor traded at least once during
our sample period. This variable is then the dependent variable in a logit regression. We
apply different regressions for call and put warrant purchases, and further subdivide those
two categories into purchases in index and single stock warrants.
Related studies concerning the trading behavior of individual investors in the stock
market all find a strong influence of past returns on the decision to trade a stock. Because
we also want to test whether previous returns and variability of the underlyings influence
the trading behavior in warrants, we define 11 non-overlapping historical returns. They
are named retu[•], where the • stands for the time period before the observation date.
The superscript u indicates those variables concerning the returns of the underlying. To
see whether past variability of the stock returns has an influence on the trading behavior,
we include the average of the squared net-returns over the last 60 trading days into
our regression analysis ((avg ret2)u[−59; 0]). To better compare our results with those
of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b), we chose the same time periods as they did. The
rationale for looking at the price of the underlying instead of the price of the warrant
is that warrants are derivatives of their underlings. The price of the warrant is mainly
10
determined by the price of the underlying.10 Thus, the investor needs to have an opinion
about future price changes of the underlying, rather than of the warrant itself. We do not
consider market-adjusted returns, because in our opinion investors look at the raw returns
of the underlying rather than calculating abnormal returns. In addition, more than half
of the warrants have indexes as an underlying, which would make a market adjustment a
fairly useless exercise.
We further test whether some exceptional prices change the propensity to buy war-
rants. One natural candidate for such a price is the strike price of the warrant. Taking into
account the strike price as a reference point, we define a variable which we call modified
moneyness (mod. moneyness). It is calculated as
mod. moneynesst =
K + (St −K)
K
for call warrants (2)
and
mod. moneynesst =
K + (K − St)
K
for put warrants (3)
where St is the price of the underlying in t and K ist the strike price of the warrant,
resulting in a measure that defines the relative distance of the actual price of the under-
lying to the strike price of a warrant in a symmetric way for call and put warrants. A
value greater than one indicates that a call as well as a put warrant is in-the-money, i.e.
the price of the underlying is higher (lower) than the strike price for call (put) warrants,
meaning that its intrinsic value is positive. We also generate dummies with the value 1 if
the mod. moneyness is
(i) 0.98 ≤ mod. moneynesst < 1 and mod. moneynesst−1 < 0.98 (near strike right) or
(ii) 1 < mod. moneynesst ≤ 1.02 and mod. moneynesst−1 > 1.02 (near strike wrong) or
(iii) 1 ≤ mod. moneynesst < 1.02 and mod. moneynesst−1 < 1 (cross strike right) or
(iv) 0.98 < mod. moneynesst ≤ 1 and mod. moneynesst−1 > 1 (cross strike wrong).
These variables measure whether the price of the underlying approaches the strike
price without crossing it in the direction desired (i), that means a positive jump of the
price of the underlying coming close to the strike price for call warrants and a declining
10Since besides the price of the underlying, other factors determine the value of warrants, i.e. volatility and the risk-
free rate, betting on changes in those variables might also be a motive to trade those securities. But for example, a pure
speculation on the volatility of the underlying requires the simultaneous purchase of call and put warrants (with different
strike prices) on the same underlying (so called straddles). We do not find such strategies in the portfolios of the individual
investors. In addition, sensitivities of the price of a warrant to changes in these determinants are much smaller than to
changes in the price of the underlying.
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price for put warrants, or disliked (ii) by the holder of the warrant and whether the price of
the underlying goes from out-of-the-money to in-the-money (iii) or the other way around
(iv). Since extreme prices also have an influence on the trading decision11, we test for
additional reference prices associated with the price of the underlying. We generated the
dummies d ref maxu[−19;−1], d ref minu[−19;−1], and d ref avgu[−19;−1] that are 1
if the price of the underling is above the maximum or below the minimum or above the
average price of the underlying of the 19 days before respectively.12
An additional dummy variable is 1 if the investor already holds the underlying of the
warrant itself in his portfolio. This gives us a hint whether calls are used to leverage the
position in the underlying, or whether puts are used to hedge the underlying, as it is often
mentioned as a strategy with derivatives in different textbooks.13 In Table 4, we report the
number of purchases of warrants when the underlying is in the portfolio of the investor.
Warrants are purchased 2,288 times while the underlying is in the portfolio. This is the
case for 2,201 calls and only 87 puts. The last number, especially in comparison to that
for calls, makes it unlikely that hedging is the main motive for trading warrants. For only
0.66% of all put purchases is the underlying actually in the portfolio of the investor. But
since an index cannot be held by an investor, we also report the ratio of put purchases
when the warrant is in the portfolio to the number of purchases in warrants on single
stocks. In 7.26% of the cases where a put warrant on a stock is purchased, the respective
stock is in the portfolio of the investor. But in every case, the investors hold relatively
more underlyings of call than put warrants.
11See Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b) for stocks and Poteshman and Serbin (2003) for options.
12We also generated dummies for one year horizon maximum and minimum prices, since Poteshman and Serbin (2003)
report more exercises in options if the underlying is near an one year high. We find some influence of the one year maximum
price and no influence of the one year minimum price. Due to the general market movement of the underlyings, prices are
rarely at their one year minimum. Since the holding period for warrants is low, we believe the shorter horizon of 19 trading
days is more appropriate to measure highs and lows of the underlyings.
13Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshmann (2007) analyze position opening option transactions from different investor
groups in the US and find that individual investors rarely open positions with long puts. They follow that hedging is an
unimportant strategy for individuals in the option market. In a survey of individual investors in Germany, only 8% state
that protecting stocks through a purchase of a warrant might be a motive to purchase a put warrant (see Klotz (2004)).
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4.1.1 Call Purchases
In the second column of Table 5, the coefficients and robust p-values for a logit regression
(with the buying dummy described above based on purchases in call warrants on all
underlyings) are reported. By looking at the past returns of the underlying, we find that
a significantly negative relationship exists between those returns and the decision to buy
a call warrant. It means that the probability that the investors buy a call is higher if
past returns of the underlying are negative in the short-run. This relation turns around
for returns that occured longer ago. The influence of past returns is stronger for short-
term returns than for returns further in the past. These results are similar to the results
found for individual investors in the stock market. The warrant investors buy calls on
negative feedback from returns on both the same and the prvious trading days. Over
longer horizons, they are positive feedback traders, since positive returns influence their
probability to buy calls positively. In addition, we find a strong positive effect of the
average squared return over the last 60 trading days on the likelihood to buy a call.
The modified moneyness of call warrants does not seem to have an influence on
the trading behavior of individual investors. But if we consider the strike price of the
warrants as a reference price and look at the dummy variables measuring whether the
price of the underlying comes close to or crosses this strike price, we find that all of these
dummies positively influence the decision to buy call warrants. This means investors buy
call warrants if the price of the underlying is approaching or crossing the strike price
of these warrants, no matter whether this happens in the right (upward moves of the
underlying for calls and decreasing prices for puts) or wrong direction. It might be the
case that investors focus on the strike price and that approaching or crossing this price
creates attention. Furthermore, Barber and Odean (2007) show that attention (although
measured differently) can drive the decision to buy a security.
Similar results are obtained for the maximum and minimum prices of the underlying.
If the price of the underlying is above its maximum or below its minimum price of the
last 19 trading days, the call warrants are more likely to be bought by the individual
investors. Given the results concerning the influence of past returns, it is not surprising
that people buy below the minimum price; since this is in line with contrarian behavior.
But the buying above the 19-day high is counterintuitive, since this seems to favor positive
feedback trading. The investors seem to buy at both extreme prices but low prices have
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a stronger effect. Together with the result from the dummy for the 19-day average price
of the underlying, which yield a negative relationship, meaning that people tend to buy if
the underlying is below that average, these results fit the negative feedback trading story.
The last variable in our logit model measures whether or not the underlying of the
warrant is in the portfolio of the respective investor. Call warrants are more likely to be
bought if the underlying is in the portfolio of an investor. This means they use these
warrants to leverage their position in the underlying.
When we split the sample into purchases of call warrants on stock market indexes
and single stocks14, we only find one structural difference in the two categories. Negative
feedback trading is stronger and lasts longer for purchases in call warrants on indexes.
While past returns of indexes negatively influence the buying decision for up to half a
year, the turning point from negative to positive feedback trading for warrants on stocks
is in one month returns.
4.1.2 Put Purchases
For buying behavior of individual investors in put warrants, the results of the logit re-
gressions for warrants on all underlyings, on indexes, and on stocks are reported in Table
6. Here, the short-term returns of the underlyings are positively related to the dummy
variable that is one if an investor buys a warrant and zero otherwise. This relation is
reversed for returns that are longer ago. Since a put warrant loses value if the price of
its underlying rises, the observed behavior is consistent with the short-term negative and
long-term positive feedback trading in call warrants and stock purchases. By the division
into buys of warrants on indexes and stocks, we observe in contrast to purchases in calls,
that the negative feedback trading in stock warrants is dependent on past returns of a
longer horizon. Just as for purchases in call warrants, the variance has a positive influence
on the probability to buy put warrants. This is the case for puts on all underlyings, as well
as indexes and stocks as underlying separately, while the influence on the buying decision
in index warrants is stronger.
In contrast to call warrants, put warrants are likely to be purchased if the moneyness
14The decision to trade derivatives on indexes and stocks might differ, since an index cannot be held by the investors, as
pointed out by Evnine and Rudd (1985). The latter is the reason for not including the dummy for the underlying in the
portfolio in the logit regression for purchases of index warrants in Tables 5, 6, and 7.
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is lower. The approaching or crossing of the strike price does have a positive influence on
the buying decision, as it was shown for call warrants. Only for put purchases with stocks
as underlying, does this effect not concern every category. Stock warrants are especially
likely to be bought if the the price of the underlying reaches a price level slightly above
the strike price. The maximum and minimum also influence the probability to buy puts
positively. The fact that the influence of the minimum price is stronger than for the
maximum price, as well as the fact that investors tend to buy puts when the price of the
underlying is below its 19-day average is a bit confusing, as it seems to contradict the
contrarian story. Further insights about the question of how important this relation is are
discussed in the next section. Another interesting result is that investors are less prone
to buy put warrants if they already hold the underlying in the portfolio. This is a further
hint that hedging is not as important as conventional beliefs and textbooks on this topic
often state.
4.1.3 Call vs. Put Purchases
As Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b) state on page 607, they compare (in the absence of
short selling possibilities) buy with sell transactions to circumvent the problem of a lack of
information concerning the investment universe the investors have to choose from when
making their purchase decision. But in comparing purchases and sales, one introduces
another problem, because purchases and sales might be driven by different motives as
mentioned before and broadly discussed in Barber and Odean (2007). The structure of
the market for bank-issued warrants gives us the opportunity to circumvent this problem
by comparing purchases in call and put warrants. As shown before, hedging does not play
an important role in that market, so the purchase of a put is a speculation on falling
prices of the underlying, i.e. a substitute for a short-sale of the underlying. Consequently,
investors can speculate on rising or falling prices of the underlying by purchasing either
call or put warrants for the same transaction costs.
In another logit regression, we regress the variables described above plus some other
variables described later on a dummy variable that is on if somebody buys a call warrant
and zero if a put warrant is purchased. Since there are unequal transactions from different
investors, we cluster these in our regression, and report coefficients and robust p-values in
Table 7. When considering the returns, we find the expected results given the literature
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and the results from Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. It is more likely that investors buy call
warrants than put warrants if the short-term past returns are negative. This dependency
does not reverse until one looks back more than half a year, which is consistent with
the literature on individual investors’ behavior in the stock market. The results hold as
well for warrants on indexes and stocks separately. That is different for the influence of
the variance on the decision to buy calls or puts. While on aggregate investors seem to
favor calls over puts if the variance is high, this relation disappears if we split our sample
into warrants on indexes and stocks. A higher moneyness neither favors the purchase of
calls nor of puts. The closeness of the price of the underlying to the strike price induces
slightly more purchases in put warrants, but does not seem to have an influence on the
decision to purchase calls or puts on stocks. The results for the maximum and minimum
prices address the question raised in Section 4.1.2 whether the observed trading patterns
are consistent with the negative feedback story for short horizons in past returns of the
underlying. We find that call warrants are less likely to be purchased than put warrants
if the price of the underlying is at its 19-day high, and more likely to be purchased if it
is at its minimum price. These facts support the view that individual investors trade on
negative feedback. The average price of the underlying does not influence the decision to
purchase calls or puts, except for warrants on single stocks, where more calls are bought if
the average price is above its mean. Not surprisingly, given Table 4 and the results stated
above, the propensity to buy call warrants is higher than to purchase put warrant if the
underlying is in the portfolio.
The format of our sample gives us the opportunity to include further interesting vari-
ables in our logit model. First, we show that investors buy call warrants with a slightly
higher time to maturity than the put warrants have when they are purchased. Secondly,
we include some variables concerning the repurchasing behavior of warrant investors. Be-
sides the variables investigated by Barber, Odean, and Strahilevitz (2004), we generate
some additional variables making use of the fact that the prices of warrants are depen-
dent on the price of their underlying and that the warrants exhibit a finite lifespan. If
a warrant approaches its maturity date, investors are forced to trade. To determine how
big the effect is, we defined a dummy variable, maturity[0; +5], that is one if a warrant
is sold but not initially bought within 5 trading days to maturity.15 If an investor was
15This variable does not concern the buying but the selling decision. Consequently, it is ignored here but included in the
logit regression in Section 4.2.3.
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forced to sell her warrant because the termination date was near, she might repurchase
another warrant on the particular underlying with a longer time to maturity, thus we set
repurchase maturity to one if an investor sold a warrant within five days to maturity
and repurchases another warrant on the same underlying in the next five trading days.
Yet the situation where the warrant runs out of time is not the only case where some
investors might be willing to switch to warrants on the same underlying but with differ-
ent characteristics (e.g. time to maturity or strike price). Therefore we define the dummy
repurchase[−5; 0] which is 1 if the investor purchases a warrant and sold a warrant on
the same underlying five trading days before. Additionally, we include a variable that is
one if a warrant is repurchased if the investor experienced a realized gain in a warrant
on the same underlying before (repurchase gain before). Another dummy is one if an
investor purchases additional warrants in a sequential trade and the actual purchase price
is lower than the price for the same warrant in the initial purchase of the round-trip trade
(addpurchase lost), testing whether investors follow the strategy to reduce the average
purchase price. Anecdotal evidence proves this to be popular behavior among individual
investors. The last variable is one if the price of the underlying decreased for call warrants
or increased for put warrants since the investor closed a sequential trade in a warrant on
the same underlying (repurchase wrongu).
The most obvious results concerning the repurchasing variables are that the investors
buy more call than put warrants if they have experienced a gain in another warrant on
the same underlying, and that they buy more puts if the underlying went into the wrong
direction after one sold a warrant on the same underlying before. Results for the other
variables are mixed. Whereas more calls on indexes are repurchased if another call on the
underlying was sold the 5 days before, less calls on stocks are bought if the near-term sale
took place, because the warrant approached its maturity date. The likelihood of buying
an additional call warrant on a stock compared to a put is higher if it has decreased in
value since the first purchase of a round-trip trade.
4.2 Determinants of the Selling Behavior
As pointed out by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b), the investigation of the selling deter-
minants is much more straight forward, because investors are restricted to the securities
they currently hold in their portfolio. Thus, the set of alternatives is defined and fairly
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small in most cases. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b) define a variable as one if an investor
sells a stock and 0 if he holds it on days where a sale took place, ignoring all other days.
We define our dummy variable slightly differently. In our analysis, the dummy is one if
an investor sells a warrant and zero on all days where the warrant is in the portfolio but
not sold. That gives us the opportunity to analyze the time-series of the selling behavior
of the broker clients at the individual level.16
For the decision about when to sell a warrant, we included some additional variables.
Besides the dummy variable that measures if one sells a warrant because it will soon
approach its maturity date (maturity[0; +5]), described in Section 4.1.3, we define two
variables as candidates to measure the disposition effect for warrant investors.17 If we apply
the simple measure of the disposition effect, comparing the holding periods of round-trip
trades that end in a gain with the holding periods of those ending in a loss, as proposed by
Shapira and Venezia (2001), we find strong evidence of the disposition effect. As shown in
Table 8, the mean and median holding period for gain investments is significantly shorter
than for loss investments. To get a more elaborate measure we define two additional
variables. First, we define the variable lossu that is equal to one if the underlying has
lost in value since a warrant was purchased. We are looking at the price changes in the
underlying because of the rationale presented in Section 4.1, and because we do not have
price information for warrants on days where they were not traded in our data set. To see
how closely our loss proxy captures the real losses, we compare our variable on days where
our data set contains warrant price data, namely the days when a round-trip trade was
closed and the actual return was realized. The correlation on these days is 0.9571, which
leads to the conclusion that our loss measure is fairly close to correctly approximating
the losses over time. The second variable on the disposition effect is motivated by studies
concerning the tax-loss effect and its influence on the disposition effect.18 They show that
the disposition effect disappears or even reverses in December and attribute this to the
fact that investors tend to sell losing investments in December because of tax advantages.
16The investors do not simultaneously hold call and put warrants on the same underlying. In 174 cases they hold call
warrants on one underlying and put warrants on another one. If we exclude those cases, the results remain nearly unchanged.
17The disposition effect was empirically (e.g. Shefrin and Statman (1985), Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b),
Shapira and Venezia (2001), Goetzmann and Massa (2004), and Feng and Seasholes (2005)) and experimentally (e.g. Weber
and Camerer (1998) and Weber and Welfens (2006)) shown to exist for individuals.
18See, for examples, Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2004), Feng and Seasholes (2005), and Ivkovic, Poterba,
and Weisbenner (2005).
18
To investigate this fact in our analysis we include a dummy if the loss variable described
above is one and if it is December (lossu dec).
4.2.1 Call Sales
From the coefficients of the return variables in Table 9, we see strong positive correlations
between the past returns and the probability to sell a call warrant. This relation is positive
(or insignificant) for all past returns, but decreases in strength the farther in the past those
returns occured. This is in accordance with the results of the studies concerning the selling
behavior, described in Section 2.1.2. As they reported, we find negative feedback trading
not only for short-term, but also longer-term past returns. In contrast to Barber and
Odean (2007), the variance does not influence the selling of call warrants positively. The
propensity of investors to sell these warrants decreases if the variability of the underlying
increases. In addition, the investors tend to sell warrants with higher moneyness. The
approaching and crossing of the price of the underlying of the strike price increases the
likelihood to sell calls, as do the underlyings when reaching a 19-day high or low, while
the maximum price has a stronger influence. Call warrants are more likely to be sold if the
price of the underlying is above its average, except for calls on indexes. All these results
show, investors seem to rely on negative feedback trading when it comes to selling calls.
Not surprisingly, the investors tend to sell warrants before the end of the lifespan of the
warrants. This might be the case because selling the warrants on the secondary market is
cheaper and more convenient than exercising the warrant. The latter would imply filling
in a form announcing the exercise and waiting a few days until the underlying or the
money from cash settlement19 is booked into the portfolio of the investor by the online
broker.
In accordance with a large amount of literature, we also find strong evidence of the
disposition effect within the group of individual investors in the market for bank-issued
warrants. The chance that people sell their warrants is smaller if they have experienced
a loss with the warrant, even after controlling for past returns of the underlying. The
direction of the influence reverses (or at least become insignificant) in the last month of the
year. This reversal of the disposition effect is (according to the authors mentioned above)
19Most of the stock warrants include cash settlement instead of delivery of the underlying. For index warrants, it is
necessary since the index cannot be delivered.
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due to tax-motivated selling because losses can be asserted for taxation. In Germany,
losses from trading in the warrants (and other securities) can offset the gains from all
kinds of security transactions that would otherwise be taxed with the personal income
tax rate.
4.2.2 Put Sales
Similar to the sales of call warrants, put warrants are more likely to be sold on negative
feedback (see Table 10). For put sales, this implies that a negative relationship exists
between the propensity to sell and past returns of the underlying. This effect can be
attributed to the trading in put warrants on indexes. The selling decision of put warrants
on stocks does not show this pattern. In contrast to the sales of calls and in accordance with
the buying behavior in calls and puts, sales of puts on indexes and stocks are positively
influenced by the variance of the past returns. Those warrants are more likely to be sold
if the price of the underlying varies a lot. The modified moneyness does not have an effect
on the selling decision, and the convergence of the price of the underlying and the strike
price influences the propensity to sell puts positively, as it was the case in all trading
categories. Whether the price of the underlying is above its 19-day high or not has a
different dependency for put sales. If the price is at its maximum, investors tend to hold
the warrants, at least in aggregate and for warrants on indexes. For stock warrants, the
relation is positive just as it exists in the other trading categories. Also in accordance
to the other findings is that the minimum price increases the selling probability of put
warrants. These warrants tend to be sold if the underlying is below its 19-day average.
As for call sales, investors sell more readily if the lifespan of the warrant is about to reach
its expiry date. In addition, the evidence for the disposition effect and the tax-loss effect
is existent for put sales. While investors tend to hold on to losing investments in general,
they more readily sell their losing warrant investments in December.
4.2.3 Call vs. Put Sales
For sales of warrants, we apply the same methodology as in Section 4.1.3, meaning that
a sale of a call warrant is coded as one and the sale of a put warrant is coded as zero.
The results for coefficients and robust p-values from the logit regression with investor
clusters are shown in Table 11. In accordance with the contrarian behavior in the short-
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run, investors tend to sell call warrants with a higher probability if the past returns of the
underlyings are higher. For mid-term past returns, the relation is negative while it reverses
again in the longer run; but the coefficients are much smaller for these dependencies.
Variance influences call sales positively. The coefficients for the strike price dummies do
not show a consistent picture with those coefficients that are significant being negative,
meaning that the influence is stronger on the sales of puts. If the price of the underlying
is at its maximum or above its average, call warrants are sold more readily while more
puts are sold at the minimum prices of the underlying. Calls are sold with a longer time
to maturity. By looking at the results for index warrants and stock warrants separately
(Columns 3 and 4 of Table 11), one can see that the results are mainly driven by the
warrants on indexes. The motives to sell calls and puts seem to be similar for stock
warrants.
5 Conclusion
We analyze the trading behavior of individual investors in option-like securities, specifi-
cally bank-issued warrants, and thus expand the growing literature of investors’ behavior
towards a new kind of security. A unique data set from a large German online broker
gives us the opportunity to analyze the trading behavior of 1,454 investors, making 89,958
transactions in 6,724 warrants on 397 underlyings.
Of special interest is the structure of the market for those warrants, that have
payoff profiles identical to plain-vanilla options. Because put warrants gain value if the
price of the underlying decreases, the purchase of a put warrant is some kind of “leveraged
short-sale”. That makes it possible to compare call with put purchases and call with put
sales instead of purchases with sales20, circumventing the problems arising from possible
different motives for the buying and selling decision for securities. In addition, we can
study the transactions in the following four trading categories: (i) call purchases (ii) call
sales, (iii) put purchases, and (iv) put sales. Furthermore, we are able to link the behavior
of these investors in warrants to their actual stock portfolios.
The main results of our analysis are that investors follow similar negative feedback
trading strategies, as measured by past returns of the underlying, in their warrant invest-
20See Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b).
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ments; as do other individual investors on the stock market in the short-run. As similarly
reported for the stock market, for past returns occurring longer ago, this behavior reverses
to positive feedback trading for purchases whereas the contrarian behavior remains for
sales. This behavior is consistent throughout all four categories, and also if we compare
call and put purchases and call and put sales directly. We also show that trading is more
likely if the price of the underlying reaches eye-catching levels, e.g. the strike price of the
warrant or its high or low over a 19 day period. Repurchases of call warrants on the same
underlying are more likely compared to put warrants if investors have experienced a gain
with a warrant on that underlying before and less likely if the underlying has lost in value
since the investor closed another warrant position in that underlying.
We find strong evidence for the disposition effect and tax-loss selling for call as well
as put warrants. The disposition effect is measured in different ways. By looking at the
stock portfolios of the investors, we can show that hedging is rare for these investors. In
only 87 cases is the underlying in the portfolio if the investor purchases a put; compared
to 2,201 times for call warrants. The probability to buy calls is positively related to the
holding of the underlying in the portfolio, while the relation between put purchases and
the portfolio holding of the underlying is negative. We do not find large differences in
the trading behavior in warrants with indexes or with stocks as underlyings, except for
the sales of puts where short-term past returns does not have an influence on the trading
probability of warrants on single stocks.
Our analysis marks only a first step into the field of trading behavior of investors in
markets for derivatives at the individual level. Especially for the interaction of investment
behavior in derivatives, together with the trading behavior in the respective underlyings
might be an insightful and promising field of future research to understand how people
make their investment decisions.
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Table 2: The Five Most Traded Index and Stock Underlyings
When counting the most traded underlyings, we summed up all transactions in different warrants on that underlying. The
column transactions shows how many transactions took place within warrants on the underlying mentioned in the columns
index and stock. The column % of all gives the portion of trades in warrants on the particular underlying compared to all
89,958 trades.
Indexes (17 underlyings) Stocks (380 underlyings)
index transactions % of all stock transactions % of all
All 17 indexes 49,573 55.11 All 380 stocks 40,385 44.89
DAX 30 36,734 40.83 Commerzbank 2,689 2.99
S&P 500 3,150 3.50 SAP 1,804 2.01
Dow Jones 30 2,355 2.62 Deutsche Bank 1,612 1.79
Nasdaq 100 2,282 2.54 VW 1,491 1.66
Nikkei 225 1,634 1.82 Siemens 1,394 1.55
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics about investors in the market for bank-issued warrants. Data in Panel A is derived
from the transactions in the warrant market, data in Panel B is derived from transactions in the stock market, and in
Panel C self-reported demographic information as well as information about investors’ strategies is given. Volumes are in
euros, returns and standard deviation are in percentages, time is measured in trading days, age is in years since birth at
the beginning of our sample period, and experience is measured in years. The last four rows are dummy variables.
obs. mean std.dev. median min. max.
Panel A: warrant portfolio
number of warrant transactions 1,454 54.98 122.14 18 1 1,461
return on warrant transactions 1,454 0.012 0.560 -0.008 -1 8.121
average holding period of warrants 1,454 68.51 77.68 43 0 767.81
average warrant trading volume 1,454 3,101 6,542 1,723 0 190,130
average time to maturity 1,454 109.73 95 108.35 0 1,046
Panel B: stock portfolio
number of stock transactions 1,413 137.12 224.97 74 0 2,838
average number of stocks in portfolio 1,413 7.05 6.13 5 1 48
average portfolio volume 1,413 32,249 57,807 14,743 4 828,423
monthly return of stock portfolio 1,324 0.004 0.026 0.004 -0.160 0.197
monthly STD of stock portfolio 1,324 0.143 0.074 0.124 0.031 0.665
Panel C: demographic and strategy information
age 1,267 39.65 9.89 38 20 84
experience 1,220 5.41 2.86 7.5 2.5 17.5
income 590 50,956 26,133 38,347 12,782 115,041
gender 1454 male 96.01% female 3.99%
retirement 1454 save 2.82% don’t save 97.18%
high risk 1454 main 19.05% not main 80.95%
fund 1454 hold 71.60% don’t hold 28.40%
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Table 4: Warrant Purchases when the Underlying is in the Portfolio
This table reports the number of purchases of warrants if the underlying was in the portfolio of the respective investor. The
number is given for all underlyings and separately for call and put warrants. We also report the ratio of purchases when
the underlying is in the portfolio, to the total purchases as well as to stock warrant purchases only.
all calls puts
purchases if underlying in portfolio 2,288 2,201 87
% of total warrant purchases 4.63% 6.06% 0.66%
total warrant purchases 49,384 36,292 13,092
% of stock warrant purchases 10.12% 10.28% 7.26%
stock warrant purchases 22,604 21,406 1,198
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Table 5: Call Purchases
This table reports coefficients and robust p-values for a logit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if an
investor purchases a specific call warrant on a trading day, and 0 otherwise for trading days on which this specific warrant
is tradeable. We do this for every warrant a specific investor traded at least once during our sample period. A d in front of
the variable name indicates that the respective variable is a dummy variable. *** (**, *) indicates significance on the 1%
(5%, 10%) level.
all underlyings indexes stocks
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
retu[0] -2.526*** (0.000) -9.782*** (0.000) -2.291*** (0.000)
retu[1] -1.833*** (0.000) -5.395*** (0.000) -1.808*** (0.000)
retu[2] -0.747*** (0.000) -2.614*** (0.000) -0.905*** (0.000)
retu[3] -0.163 (0.431) -1.713*** (0.003) -0.283 (0.207)
retu[4] 0.222 (0.270) -0.315 (0.585) 0.050 (0.820)
retu[−19;−5] 0.421*** (0.000) -0.090 (0.616) 0.390*** (0.000)
retu[−39;−20] 0.057 (0.162) -0.892*** (0.000) 0.197*** (0.000)
retu[−59;−40] 0.109*** (0.010) -0.089 (0.513) 0.173*** (0.000)
retu[−119;−60] 0.138*** (0.000) -1.005*** (0.000) 0.237*** (0.000)
retu[−179;−120] -0.025 (0.218) -0.881*** (0.000) 0.055*** (0.005)
retu[−239;−180] 0.155*** (0.000) 0.307*** (0.000) 0.138*** (0.000)
(avg ret2)u[−59; 0] 21.812*** (0.000) 32.041 (0.379) 35.634*** (0.000)
mod. moneyness -0.003 (0.212) -0.007** (0.029) -0.003 (0.367)
d near strike right 0.802*** (0.000) 0.993*** (0.000) 0.634*** (0.000)
d near strike wrong 0.788*** (0.000) 0.863*** (0.000) 0.604*** (0.000)
d cross strike right 0.887*** (0.000) 1.173*** (0.000) 0.487*** (0.000)
d cross strike wrong 0.913*** (0.000) 1.057*** (0.000) 0.466*** (0.000)
d maxu[−19;−1] 0.186*** (0.000) 0.058* (0.067) 0.331*** (0.000)
d minu[−19;−1] 0.385*** (0.000) 0.134*** (0.000) 0.402*** (0.000)
d avgu[−19;−1] -0.194*** (0.000) -0.197*** (0.000) -0.142*** (0.000)
d underlying portfolio 0.218*** (0.000) — — 0.295*** (0.000)
cons. -5.388*** (0.000) -5.110*** (0.000) -5.552*** (0.000)
pseudo R2 0.010 0.021 0.009
obs. 5,823,510 1,892,622 3,930,888
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Table 6: Put Purchases
This table reports coefficients and robust p-values for a logit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if an
investor purchases a specific put warrant on a trading day, and 0 otherwise for trading days on which this specific warrant
is tradeable. We do this for every warrant a specific investor traded at least once during our sample period. A d in front of
the variable name indicates that the respective variable is a dummy variable. *** (**, *) indicates significance on the 1%
(5%, 10%) level.
all underlyings indexes stocks
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
retu[0] 2.174*** (0.000) 3.944*** (0.000) 1.367** (0.012)
retu[1] 2.795*** (0.000) 3.391*** (0.000) 2.467*** (0.000)
retu[2] 0.507 (0.403) 1.234* (0.089) -0.029 (0.979)
retu[3] 0.626 (0.272) -0.088 (0.901) 1.626*** (0.004)
retu[4] 0.247 (0.674) -0.916 (0.189) 2.058*** (0.000)
retu[−19;−5] 0.064 (0.731) -0.558** (0.013) 1.283*** (0.000)
retu[−39;−20] 0.031 (0.812) 0.075 (0.619) 0.246 (0.259)
retu[−59;−40] 0.172 (0.142) 0.394*** (0.008) 0.059 (0.764)
retu[−119;−60] -0.835*** (0.000) -1.107*** (0.000) -0.458*** (0.000)
retu[−179;−120] -0.887*** (0.000) -1.618*** (0.000) -0.128 (0.196)
retu[−239;−180] -0.474*** (0.000) -0.979*** (0.000) -0.086 (0.242)
(avg ret2)u[−59; 0] 12.761** (0.037) 332.982*** (0.000) 12.732* (0.060)
mod. moneyness -0.027*** (0.000) -0.021*** (0.000) -0.088*** (0.000)
d near strike right 1.570*** (0.000) 1.615*** (0.000) 1.288*** (0.000)
d near strike wrong 1.336*** (0.000) 1.337*** (0.000) 0.140 (0.786)
d cross strike right 1.542*** (0.000) 1.597*** (0.000) 0.619 (0.108)
d cross strike wrong 1.547*** (0.000) 1.538*** (0.000) 0.761* (0.051)
d maxu[−19;−1] 0.232*** (0.000) 0.201*** (0.000) 0.439*** (0.000)
d minu[−19;−1] 0.323*** (0.000) 0.341*** (0.000) 0.361*** (0.001)
d avgu[−19;−1] -0.339*** (0.000) -0.307*** (0.000) -0.557*** (0.000)
d underlying portfolio -0.256** (0.020) — — 0.025 (0.825)
cons. -5.694*** (0.000) -5.668*** (0.000) -6.069*** (0.000)
pseudo. R2 0.018 0.021 0.012
obs. 3,650,029 3,074,842 575,187
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Table 7: Call vs. Put Purchases
This table reports coefficients and robust p-values for a logit regression with clusters for the different investors. The dependent
variable is a dummy that is 1 if an investor purchases a call warrant and 0 if an investor purchases a put warrant. A d in
front of the variable name indicates that the respective variable is a dummy variable. *** (**, *) indicates significance on
the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
all underlyings indexes stocks
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
retu[0] -1.528 (0.123) -7.789*** (0.000) -2.159** (0.040)
retu[1] -2.099*** (0.007) -5.630*** (0.000) -3.952*** (0.000)
retu[2] 0.452 (0.551) -2.732** (0.013) -1.076 (0.231)
retu[3] -0.253 (0.716) -1.709* (0.095) -3.055*** (0.000)
retu[4] 1.023 (0.120) 1.279 (0.167) -3.007*** (0.001)
retu[−19;−5] 0.527* (0.075) -0.010 (0.977) -1.526*** (0.000)
retu[−39;−20] -0.789*** (0.000) -1.863*** (0.000) -0.536** (0.034)
retu[−59;−40] -0.677*** (0.000) -1.229*** (0.000) -0.327* (0.077)
retu[−119;−60] -0.155 (0.205) -1.082*** (0.000) 0.157 (0.183)
retu[−179;−120] 0.134 (0.282) -0.169 (0.418) 0.003 (0.979)
retu[−239;−180] 0.498*** (0.000) 0.403** (0.022) 0.219** (0.016)
(avg ret2)u[−59; 0] 607.294*** (0.000) 69.632 (0.479) -25.518 (0.210)
mod. moneyness 0.008 (0.239) 0.022 (0.104) -0.002 (0.547)
d near strike right -0.618*** (0.000) -0.387*** (0.006) -0.518 (0.109)
d near strike wrong -0.099 (0.366) 0.179 (0.105) 0.745 (0.150)
d cross strike right -0.381*** (0.000) -0.181* (0.086) -0.150 (0.683)
d cross strike wrong -0.271*** (0.006) 0.025 (0.796) -0.178 (0.645)
d maxu[−19;−1] -0.370*** (0.000) -0.225*** (0.000) -0.203* (0.081)
d minu[−19;−1] 0.120** (0.025) -0.056 (0.333) 0.327** (0.016)
d avgu[−19;−1] -0.085 (0.167) 0.008 (0.915) 0.622*** (0.000)
d underlying portfolio 1.505*** (0.000) — — 0.261 (0.295)
time to maturity 0.004*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.000)
d repurchase[−5; 0] -0.053 (0.407) 0.210*** (0.004) 0.081 (0.666)
d repurchase maturity[−5; 0] 0.234 (0.288) 0.215 (0.281) -1.531* (0.051)
d repurchase gain before 0.182*** (0.002) 0.151** (0.013) 0.987*** (0.000)
d addpurchase lost -0.007 (0.916) -0.101 (0.139) 0.763*** (0.000)
d repurchase wrongu -0.557*** (0.000) -0.565*** (0.000) -0.200 (0.291)
cons. 0.070 (0.476) 0.046 (0.713) 1.576*** (0.000)
pseudo R2 0.120 0.036 0.058
obs. 42,054 22,145 19,909
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Table 8: Holding Periods of Winning and Losing Warrant Investments
This table reports the average and median holding periods in trading days for warrant investments. Columns 3 and 4 report
the holding periods dependent on whether the investment ended in a gain or a loss. The differences in the means and
medians were tested with a t-test and a median test, respectively. The p-values are given in the last column.
holding period all gain loss diff. p-value
mean 33.4 25.43 43.32 17.89 <0.0001
median 8 6 11 5 <0.0001
obs. 28,393 15,747 12,646
33
Table 9: Call Sales
This table reports coefficients and robust p-values for a logit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if an
investor sells a specific call warrant and 0 when the investor holds the warrant in his portfolio without selling it. A d in
front of the variable name indicates that the respective variable is a dummy variable. *** (**, *) indicates significance on
the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
all underlyings indexes stocks
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
retu[0] 5.611*** (0.000) 17.911*** (0.000) 5.497*** (0.000)
retu[1] 4.407*** (0.000) 11.484*** (0.000) 4.748*** (0.000)
retu[2] 1.689*** (0.000) 5.642*** (0.000) 2.635*** (0.000)
retu[3] 0.537 (0.130) 1.935* (0.056) 1.597*** (0.000)
retu[4] 0.324 (0.363) 2.098** (0.046) 1.387*** (0.000)
retu[−19;−5] 0.404*** (0.000) 1.757*** (0.000) 0.853*** (0.000)
retu[−39;−20] 0.581*** (0.000) 1.890*** (0.000) 0.792*** (0.000)
retu[−59;−40] 0.283*** (0.000) 1.346*** (0.000) 0.427*** (0.000)
retu[−119;−60] 0.136*** (0.000) 0.359*** (0.003) 0.196*** (0.000)
retu[−179;−120] -0.044 (0.154) -0.556*** (0.000) 0.089*** (0.001)
retu[−239;−180] -0.003 (0.895) 0.352*** (0.000) 0.029 (0.260)
(avg ret2)u[−59; 0] -104.121*** (0.000) -286.966*** (0.000) -53.538*** (0.000)
mod. moneyness 0.005*** (0.006) 0.015*** (0.000) 0.004* (0.095)
d near strike right 0.592*** (0.000) 0.597*** (0.000) 0.086 (0.574)
d near strike wrong 0.815*** (0.000) 0.711*** (0.000) 0.405*** (0.000)
d cross strike right 0.738*** (0.000) 0.599*** (0.000) 0.565*** (0.000)
d cross strike wrong 0.863*** (0.000) 0.756*** (0.000) 0.446*** (0.000)
d maxu[−19;−1] 0.380*** (0.000) 0.173*** (0.000) 0.393*** (0.000)
d minu[−19;−1] 0.161*** (0.000) 0.167*** (0.000) 0.248*** (0.000)
d avgu[−19;−1] 0.087*** (0.000) 0.037 (0.220) 0.066*** (0.003)
d maturity[0;+5] 1.646*** (0.000) 1.213*** (0.000) 1.832*** (0.000)
d lossu -0.632*** (0.000) -0.460*** (0.000) -0.691*** (0.000)
d lossu dec 0.177*** (0.000) 0.021 (0.728) 0.228*** (0.000)
cons. -3.978*** (0.000) -3.704*** (0.000) -4.360*** (0.000)
pseudo R2 0.029 0.028 0.033
obs. 1,253,568 270,916 982,652
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Table 10: Put Sales
This table reports coefficients and robust p-values for a logit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if an
investor sells a specific put warrant and 0 when the investor holds the warrant in his portfolio without selling it. A d in
front of the variable name indicates that the respective variable is a dummy variable. *** (**, *) indicates significance on
the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
all underlyings indexes stocks
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
retu[0] -2.810*** (0.000) -6.754*** (0.000) -0.124 (0.906)
retu[1] -4.847*** (0.000) -9.456*** (0.000) 0.317 (0.735)
retu[2] -1.729*** (0.003) -4.331*** (0.000) 0.663 (0.447)
retu[3] -1.316** (0.023) -3.141*** (0.000) 0.512 (0.573)
retu[4] -0.831 (0.137) -2.058*** (0.005) 0.392 (0.650)
retu[−19;−5] -0.017 (0.924) -0.493** (0.036) 0.768*** (0.002)
retu[−39;−20] -0.109 (0.374) -0.391** (0.012) 0.334* (0.070)
retu[−59;−40] -0.111 (0.386) 0.037 (0.823) -0.150 (0.453)
retu[−119;−60] -0.566*** (0.000) -0.876*** (0.000) -0.266*** (0.003)
retu[−179;−120] -0.539*** (0.000) -0.739*** (0.000) -0.433*** (0.000)
retu[−239;−180] -0.138** (0.026) -0.085 (0.384) 0.022 (0.808)
(avg ret2)u[−59; 0] 5.830 (0.737) 407.754*** (0.000) 157.442*** (0.000)
mod. moneyness -0.000 (0.947) 0.013 (0.131) -0.019 (0.560)
d near strike right 0.584*** (0.000) 0.501*** (0.000) 0.360 (0.324)
d near strike wrong 0.493*** (0.000) 0.380*** (0.000) 1.185*** (0.002)
d cross strike right 0.826*** (0.000) 0.715*** (0.000) 1.083*** (0.000)
d cross strike wrong 0.702*** (0.000) 0.691*** (0.000) -0.768 (0.298)
d maxu[−19;−1] -0.100*** (0.007) -0.072* (0.070) 0.311** (0.014)
d minu[−19;−1] 0.319*** (0.000) 0.152*** (0.000) 0.316*** (0.006)
d avgu[−19;−1] -0.170*** (0.000) -0.130*** (0.000) -0.336*** (0.000)
d maturity[0;+5] 1.111*** (0.000) 1.094*** (0.000) 1.452*** (0.000)
d lossu -0.737*** (0.000) -0.747*** (0.000) -0.657*** (0.000)
d lossu dec 0.231*** (0.000) 0.225*** (0.001) -0.139 (0.500)
cons. -2.678*** (0.000) -2.682*** (0.000) -3.506*** (0.000)
pseudo R2 0.042 0.052 0.034
obs. 218,317 179,657 38,660
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Table 11: Call vs. Put Sales
This table reports coefficients and robust p-values for a logit regression with clusters for the different investors. The dependent
variable is a dummy that is 1 if an investor sells a call warrant and 0 if an investor sells a put warrant. A d in front of the
variable name indicates that the respective variable is a dummy variable. *** (**, *) indicates significance on the 1% (5%,
10%) level.
all underlyings indexes stocks
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
retu[0] 6.724*** (0.000) 11.589*** (0.000) 0.934 (0.363)
retu[1] 7.148*** (0.000) 9.610*** (0.000) 1.096 (0.271)
retu[2] 2.855*** (0.001) 3.101** (0.021) -0.841 (0.352)
retu[3] 1.387* (0.076) 0.738 (0.522) -2.090** (0.046)
retu[4] 1.436* (0.065) -0.676 (0.543) -0.610 (0.574)
retu[−19;−5] 0.329 (0.309) -0.163 (0.679) -1.181*** (0.001)
retu[−39;−20] -0.521** (0.015) -1.588*** (0.000) -0.434* (0.075)
retu[−59;−40] -0.730*** (0.000) -1.950*** (0.000) -0.155 (0.494)
retu[−119;−60] -0.460*** (0.000) -1.461*** (0.000) -0.022 (0.855)
retu[−179;−120] -0.064 (0.529) -0.777*** (0.000) -0.011 (0.921)
retu[−239;−180] 0.392*** (0.000) 0.145 (0.417) 0.049 (0.602)
(avg ret2)u[−59; 0] 613.566*** (0.000) 63.965 (0.499) -43.070* (0.062)
mod. moneyness 0.019* (0.050) 0.012 (0.174) -0.001 (0.861)
d near strike right -0.661*** (0.000) -0.243* (0.053) -0.589 (0.157)
d near strike wrong 0.077 (0.505) 0.201* (0.092) -0.235 (0.571)
d cross strike right -0.594*** (0.000) -0.271** (0.012) -0.919*** (0.002)
d cross strike wrong -0.100 (0.300) 0.029 (0.780) 0.687 (0.224)
d maxu[−19;−1] 0.152*** (0.002) 0.246*** (0.000) 0.012 (0.931)
d minu[−19;−1] -0.131** (0.046) -0.104 (0.182) 0.112 (0.434)
d avgu[−19;−1] 0.124*** (0.010) 0.094 (0.100) 0.942*** (0.000)
time to maturity 0.003*** (0.000) 0.001 (0.147) 0.002*** (0.000)
cons. -0.150** (0.035) 0.049 (0.587) 1.699*** (0.000)
pseudo R2 0.122 0.056 0.051
obs. 28,312 15,007 13,305
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